Abstract (1980-1989/1993)
well. I argue that Turkey's transition to neoliberalism in the post-1980 period encompasses all of these "anomalous" features.
To explain how these seeming anomalies can take place under neoliberalism, I use worldsystem biography as a methodological tool to examine Turkey's transition to neoliberalism under the "Özal Decade" (1980 "Özal Decade" ( -1989 . Turgut Özal (1927 Turgut Özal ( -1993 was the main architect of this transition and the most influential figure in Turkish politics in the 1980s and the early 1990s. A world-system biography of Özal also helps us critique another universalizing argument regarding the diffusion and spread of neoliberalism worldwide. There is a growing literature suggesting that U.S.-trained neoliberal technocrats have played a prominent role in pushing forward neoliberal reforms, especially in the global south (Williamson and Haggard 1994; Kolko 1997; Babb 2001) . Following in the footsteps of John Meyer's work on global diffusion processes, some of these explanations argue that these technocrats have played a critical role in unidirectional diffusion, imitation, and adoption of shared professional culture, institutional norms, and technocratic policy commitments associated with the neoliberal paradigm (Babb 2001 ). The analysis provided in this paper, however, shows that the role of domestic technocrats in the making of neoliberal regimes cannot be properly understood without understanding their formation in a broader world-historical context. Moreover, what enabled these political entrepreneurs to become architects of neoliberal regimes was not their professional training alone but-more importantly-their embeddedness within key domestic and global networks that helped them penetrate into economic, political and social spheres. This provided an ability to negotiate and reconcile the interests of the world hegemonic bloc (including their economic institutions such as IMF, World Bank) with the interests of the domestic, local elite groups, organizations and movements.
This article examines the origins of Turkey's neoliberal transformation in world-historical perspective by highlighting key interactions between the rise and crisis of U.S. hegemony, the historical trajectory of political-economic developments in Turkey, and events that shaped Özal's political career and his decisions. As Figure 1 shows, this multilayered analysis simultaneously deals with the three distinct temporalities identified by Fernand Braudel -the longue durée, the conjuncture, and the event-time (histoire événementielle)-and interconnections between three distinct spatialities: a macro-space encompassing the world-system, a meso-space focusing to a particular region of the world-economy and a micro-space of an individual. In light of these multilevel temporal-spatial interactions, I put forward two main arguments. First, I argue that Turkey's neoliberal transition of the 1980s was not primarily related to resolving the crisis of the existing Turkish bourgeoisie or reconstituting class power in favor of this segment of capital. The Istanbul-based industrial bourgeoisie-the strongest of which were established during Turkey's étatist era-was the main beneficiary of import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies of the 1960s and 1970s. Likewise, Turkey's transition to neoliberalism was not an assault on social democratic forces that took control of the state either.
Architects of the neoliberal transition-first and foremost Turgut Özal himself-were part of the same cohort of center-right wing technocrats, politicians, and bureaucrats who were in charge of coordinating ISI-led developmentalist policies in previous decades. Instead, Turkey's transition to neoliberalism was primarily focused on sustaining Turkey's political alignment with the declining world-hegemonic power: the United States. In late 1970s, the rise of extreme left wing, radical Islamist, and neo-fascist movements started to paralyze Turkish political society and to create structural opportunities for the success of anti-American and anti-systemic movements.
This was a manifestation of a hegemonic crisis at two levels. Turkish political society was losing its hegemony over its civil society at the national level, and consequently the United States was losing its hegemony over Turkey at the world-systemic level. The unexpected success of the 1979 Iranian revolution, escalation of anti-American sentiments in the Middle East region as a whole, and increasing rivalry with the USSR pushed the United States to win back Turkey-as a strategic ally and a NATO power in the Middle East-to its side. Hence the priority of the Turkish neoliberal project-designed by an unusual World Bank, IMF and OECD alliance-was to establish a stable political-economic environment which would help Turkey's political society reassert its hegemony over civil society and allow for the penetration of the changing interests of the world-hegemonic power in the region. This could not have been possible with the use of brute force alone or a redistribution of wealth from middle and lower classes to the highest income clusters. Instead, attempts by the United States to reassert its hegemony in Turkey and the Middle East coincided with attempts to co-opt radicalized segments of Turkish civil society in line with the interests of the world-hegemonic bloc. This hegemonic co-optation went side by side with (1) policies that helped create a new segment of the Turkish bourgeoisie-the "Islamic bourgeoisie"-by opening paths of capital accumulation to the sections of the Turkish pettybourgeoisie who had been excluded and marginalized by ISI policies (such as the Anatolianbased small and medium scale merchant capitalists and petty-bourgeoisie which established the backbone of radical Islamic movements), (2) attempts to create a large middle class consumer society, and (3) a new form of populism which included a pragmatic redistribution to lower segments of the society. As a paradoxical consequence of these dynamics, income inequality started to decrease during Turkey's transition to neoliberalism (see Figure 2 ). Secondly, I argue that Turgut Özal's role in Turkey's transition to neoliberalism cannot be reduced to his professional training as a neoliberal technocrat. There were many other U.S.-trained technocrats or economists at the World Bank who had a better understanding of neoclassical economics during Turkey's neoliberal transformation in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. What was distinctive about Özal was his position as a power broker who took multiple and ambiguous roles in global financial institutions, national government, business, and other 1 It is difficult to find reliable measures of Gini estimations over time using similar methodology and definitions. For a balanced picture, the figure above shows the average, maximum and minimum national Gini estimations using most available data for this period. Gini for 1963 can be found in SPO and UN (1981) databases; 1968 can be found in UN (1981) , Bulutay et al. (1971) , Fields (1989) , Jain (1975) , Lecaillon et al. (1984) ; 1973 can be found in SPO, UN (1981) and Fields (1989) ; 1987 can be found in State Institute of Statistics (1987) . For 1994, in addition to World Bank sources, I used SIS calculations, which were higher than World Bank estimations. The World Bank value for 1994 is 41.53, the minimum estimation in the figure whereas SIS calculation is 49. Gini coefficient figures from 1987 to 2010 can be found in World Bank database. Also see Yeldan (2000) . The results are consistent with OECD (2011). From the beginning, the U.S.-led "development project" was very much related to geopolitical concerns, especially to the attempts by the United States to contain the influence of the Soviet Union. Together with the disastrous experience of the return to self-regulating markets in the inter-war period, these economic and geopolitical concerns pushed the new world-hegemonic power to implement a number of development assistance projects from 1945 onwards (Brett 1985:106-107; McMichael 2012:42) . The United States also pioneered an international framework of aid through the establishment of multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF in 1944, which pursued an organized strategy to promote nationally managed economic growth that favored industrialization and state-led planning in Third World countries.
ISI-led Developmentalist Era
These macro-level transformations of the post-war era decisively ended the pragmatic Turkish-USSR rapprochement of the inter-war period. While the Turkey-USSR relationship started to become more contentious, the Turkey-U.S. relationship began its honeymoon. In 1945, Turkey decided to abandon its single party system and both the CHP (Republican People's Party) and the newly established center-right wing opposition party-the DP (Democratic Party)-started to compete with each other to liberalize and restructure the economy along the suggestions of the United States and Bretton Woods organizations. Unlike many other Third World countries which tried to avoid taking sides in the struggle between the United States and the USSR, Turkish political actors of the era proudly took the side of the United States (Ersel et al. 2002:280; Ahmad 1993:119 (Ahmad 1993:119) .
In 1955, the Turkish foreign minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu even went to the Bandung Conference to convince its participants to align with the U.S.-led Western bloc (Ersel et al. 2002:280) . These gestures, of course, were not ignored by the United States. From 1945 onwards, U.S. policy-makers also did their best to sustain Turkey's loyalty through offering generous military aid and development assistance. In a couple of years, through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Turkey received $350 million in bilateral aid and credit from the U.S., which was almost equal to Turkey's balance of payments deficit at the time (Ersel et al. 2002:131; Yerasimos 2005:178-183) . Not surprisingly, from 1945 to the early 1970s, Turkish political society rarely deviated from the political and economic suggestions of the United States.
In the social sphere, Turkey's alignment with the United States and restructuring of its economy in line with the U.S.-led development project went hand in hand with an anticommunist and anti-left sentiment. On December 4, 1945, for instance, students, Islamists and
Turanist nationalists-numbering around 20 thousand-started looting Istanbul's left-wing newspapers, publishing houses and bookstores shouting "death to the communists!" and "Down with Russia". This red-baiting riot-known as the Tan Incident-was the first political activity in which Turgut Özal participated as a student (Çölaşan 1989:13; Doğan 1994:16) . Curiously, together with Turgut Özal, many other would-be right wing presidents, prime ministers of Turkey in the following decades-including Süleyman Demirel and Necmettin Erbakanproudly participated in these anti-left riots (see Çandar 2013:30; Doğan 1994:16-17 (Çölaşan 1989:13; Doğan 1994:15; Acar 2002:64 as a hub to meet with other politically active conservative students (Özal 1994:88) , and some were likely influenced by a Naksibendi sheikh named Abdülaziz Efendi (Birand and Yalçın 2001:22; Taşkın 2012:66 (Çandar 2013:30) . "An admiration for America was observed in Özal similar to those engineers who were granted scholarships to be sent to the United States after the war" (Cemal 1989:113; Taşkın 2012:66-67 (Doğan 1994:24) .
The formula for "catching up," of course, was to be provided by "this civilization" and its and impose control over public spending and allocation of foreign exchange (Keyder 1987:135; Yerasimos 2005:223) . In response, the Menderes government appointed Özal and Demireltogether with another ITU engineer, Saim Evizi -to a board responsible for preparing the 2-year State Investment Plan (Doğan 1994:22; Çölaşan 1989:132) . This board became the nucleus of and credits-dispossessed a mass of villagers from their lands, created a massive wave of migration to large cities, and helped create a large reserve army suitable for industrialization (Keyder 1987: 138) . These same policies also helped create a new domestic bourgeoisie, which established businesses and achieved significant capital accumulation during the 1950s (Keyder 1987:137; Buğra 1994; Yerasimos 2005:401-403; Kazgan 2002:98) . Both elements were the sine quo non for the ISI development push that took shape in the 1960s. As early as 1951, the World Bank explained the rationale for recommending agricultural development in Turkey "not as an 
Crisis of U.S. Hegemony and the Rise of the Neoliberal Globalization Project
The escalation of class struggle in Turkey, starting in the mid-1960s, was not necessarily related This escalation of Turkish social unrest was not independent from broader level social discontent in the world. Starting with the late 1960s, it was apparent that something was wrong with the U.S.-centered capitalist world economy (Arrighi 1994:300-301) . The looming crisis of U.S. world hegemony coincided with a rapid escalation of worldwide social unrest (Arrighi et al. 1989:105; Silver and Slater 1999) . Especially in semi-peripheral countries, emerging social movements contained strong anti-American sentiments and anti-systemic tendencies. Turkey was not an exception. In addition to rising labor unrest, this period witnessed the radicalization of the youth movement and the rise of radical and revolutionary organizations. (Tümtürk 2002; Doğan 1994:32-33 ).
This letter explained the necessity of liberalization, deregulation and implementation of largescale privatization to save Turkey from its political and economic crises.
Özal was not a Chicago Boy. There were many other Turkish economists at the World Bank who had a better understanding of and faith in neoclassical/neoliberal economics. Özal was something else. He represented the emergence of a new kind of power broker who took multiple and ambiguous roles in government, business, and other civil society organizations to pursue their interests. He had a foot in multiple camps encompassing Turkish civil and political societies. He was close to religious communities, to nationalist groups, to liberals, to leading business circles and to many political leaders. He did not hesitate to offer positions within the institutions he commanded or the resources under his control. In 1967, he even caused a political scandal when a newspaper reported that thanks to Özal, the SPO was full of religious communities, the takunyalılar, who performed prayers in its corridors during work hours and collectively went to Friday sermons (Çölaşan 1989:43-44) . Simultaneously, rumor had it that Özal was redistributing state money to leading businesses on a patronage basis (Çölaşan 1989:44-45) . Overall, he had managed to convert his experience at the SPO into a particular form of social capital which could later be converted into political capital, in the pursuit of which he was extremely successful.
After returning from the United States in 1973, Özal further consolidated his relations with diverse sections of civil society. His penetration into business circles was particularly impressive.
He first started to work at Sabancı Holding as a general coordinator, and later he became the chairman, member of board of directors and chief general manager of private companies including Çelik Endüstri, Çemsan, Çetaş, Parsan, Esaş, Burtrak (Doğan 1994:33) and a partner of companies such as SILM, Ege Metal Sanayi and Ozban Otomotiv ve Metal Ticaret (Çölaşan 1989:106) . In the automobile sector, Turgut Özal also worked as a representative of a Japanese automotive firm (Doğan 1994:33-34 (Tümtürk 2002; Doğan 1994:32-33 ).
In the course of the 1970s, Özal also tried to enter into Turkish politics, but here he was extremely unsuccessful. As a supremely pragmatic politician, he was nearly indifferent to existing ideological fragmentation in the Turkish right, and could ally himself easily with ultranationalists, Islamists, or secular center-right parties. Actually, he tried all of them. First he tried with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP 
Escalation of Crises and the Impossible Rise of a Failed Politician
Everything changed, however, with the confluence of multiple crises in the late 1970s. The Likewise, the United States was gradually losing its influence over Turkey. Escalation of class conflict and the rise of extreme-left and right wing movements polarized the existing political structure by pressuring domestic political actors to deviate from the recommendations of the world-hegemonic power. This deviation first became explicit in 1974 when the Turkish military invaded Northern Cyprus against the will of the United States. In response to the Cyprus Operation, the U.S. Congress imposed an embargo on arms sales to Turkey and a political crisis between the United States and Turkey started. These tensions were not over when the 1978/9 economic crisis erupted. In 1978, while negotiating with the IMF, Prime Minister Ecevit visited the Soviet Union and signed a political cooperation document between Ankara and Moscow. According to Ecevit, "Turkey was shouldering an unfairly large burden of NATO and was overdependent on the United States" (Hale 2013:117) . These statements were explicitly linked to the unfolding crisis of U.S. hegemony on a world-scale.
The unexpected success of the 1979 Iranian revolution forced the United States to turn its full attention to Turkey. In a couple of months, American newspapers were full of Iran-Turkey comparisons, stressing the similarities between two countries (e.g. escalation of social-political turmoil, increase in poverty, politicization of the ghettoes, rise of both left-wing and Islamist political extremists with a commitment to anti-imperialism or anti-Americanism) and the necessity for providing Turkey with economic aid so that it does not become the next Iran.
General Alexander Haig, Supreme NATO Commander in Europe, warned that Turkey could be lost to NATO in a matter of weeks if nothing was done soon (Chicago Tribune 1979:B2).
Suddenly, Turkey's economic problems were discussed in reference to geopolitics: how to avoid "losing" Turkey like Iran, or the urgent necessity to replace Iranian spy bases (Samuelson 1979) .
Actually, both the United States and Bretton Woods institutions were inclined to provide all necessary support for Turkey if they could find someone trustworthy in Turkish political society who could take necessary steps to realign Turkey within the world-hegemonic bloc. Özal was the perfect candidate for such a task. In 1979, when Demirel became the prime minister again, he knew what he needed to do. He appointed Özal as the undersecretary of the prime ministry and as the acting head of the SPO. This double appointment was quite unusual at the time, but Turgut Özal himself had demanded this exceptional position to avoid any interference from the state bureaucracy. Özal's initial task was to prepare an economic reform package to stabilize the economy with the extreme austerity conditions the IMF asked for. This package became the "January 24, 1980 austerity program," and established the economic preconditions for a transition to neoliberalism. Özal's devaluation of Turkish lira against the dollar was much "sharper than even what the IMF had asked for or expected" (Ahmad 1993:178) . (Zürcher 2003:268-269) . After the coup, all existing political parties were banned, all civic associations (that could be related to politics) were shut down, and nearly all left wing and radical political organizations were crushed. Erdem -as the finance minister. Right after the coup, influential business circles -including the "emperor" of the big bourgeoisie, Vehbi Koç -asked Kenan Evren (the junta leader) to keep Özal at the command of the economy (Taşkın 2012:68; Boratav 2007) . It turns out that these demands were parallel to the demands of the IMF, World Bank and the White House (Ahmad 1993:183, 189 ).
Neoliberalism as Reassertion of
Despite existing contentions, the 1980 military coup and the Özal's reforms were mutually reinforcing. While the coup aimed "to provide the period of tranquility Özal was seeking, marked by an absence of politics and dissent in all forms" (Ahmad 1993:178-179 ), Özal's economic reforms included a number of feaures that aimed to provide long-term social and political stability by coopting radicalized segments of the society and realigning them with the world-hegemonic bloc. It was these differing methods used in pursuit of hegemonic co-optation which gave a "heterodox" character to neoliberalism in Turkey.
First of all, instead of merely restoring class power in favor of İstanbul-based industrial bourgeoisie, Özal's reforms also helped develop a new, Anatolian-based capital group often labeled as the "Islamic bourgeoisie" by Turkish social scientists (Kazgan 2002; Yavuz 2006; Yavuz 2009; Öniş 1997) . While this Anatolian-based petty-bourgeoisie was among the losers of the ISI developmentalist era, neoliberalism provided them with ample opportunities for capital accumulation (Yavuz 2009:52) . During the Özal decade, these domestic entrepreneurs intensified business activities and small and medium-size enterprises spread to various parts of Anatolia. In the 1980s, there was a "profound take-off in the volume and depth of Islamic business activity, a process that clearly received significant boost from the major inflows of Saudi capital arriving in the country to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by the liberal economic environment, notably in the financial sphere" (Öniş 1997:758) . By the 1990s, private entrepreneurship transcended the boundaries of major cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara and had spread to many cities such as Çorum, Denizli, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Bursa, Konya or Eskişehir, which became the new manufacturing zones of Turkey (Kazgan 2002:293-294) . At the same time, some of these businesses rose above the status of small and medium size enterprises, accumulated capital to a degree that challenged the older and larger bourgeoisie, engaged in transnational trade, and became known as "Anatolian Tigers." They formed a new business organization called "The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association" (MÜSİAD) which became the rival of the TÜSİAD of the big bourgeoisie.
Meanwhile the ideological orientations of these entrepreneurs were radically transformed.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, these small businessmen and shop-keepers had been an important constituency of Erbakan's Islamist MSP (Öniş 1997:757) Secondly, instead of shrinking the middle classes, Turkey's transition to neoliberalism under Özal was curiously interested in creating a large middle-class society. For Özal, long-run social and political stability was depended on creation of large middle-classes (middle pillars [Orta direk], as he put it). His reforms promoted the emergence of new entrepreneurs as well as the creation of a large consumer society. A flexible accumulation system, dismantling of the bureaucratic rigidities of the étatist era, and an abundance of labor reserves created a climate of enrichissez-vous ("enrich yourselves") for would-be entrepreneurs. Likewise, the lifting of import restrictions helped American and Japanese goods enter into the domestic market and led to an unprecedented consumer-boom. Even those whose wealth did not increase in real terms went on a buying spree thanks to a very extensive system of hire purchase, installment sales and credits (Zürcher, 2003:308; also see Taşkın 2013:25-27, 61-67) .
This conscious interest in creating a stronger middle class society was also evident in Özal's initial privatization attempts. Privatization campaigns in 1987 "displayed specially made photographs and films depicting typical representatives of lower-income and middle-income groups, with the following statement by Özal as a caption: 'This is the first time in this country that our people are offered such an opportunity! Now, all of my citizens can have a share in Turkey's riches, by holding capital ownership and getting their share from profits'" (Ilkin 1994:81) . This was not merely populist propaganda. Özal's privatization program was not a form of "shock therapy" aimed at catapulting a few individuals into the Fortune list of world's wealthiest people overnight by transferring state economic enterprises, as was the case of Mexico in 1992 and elsewhere (see Harvey 2005a:17) . It initially targeted the participation of middleincome populations and small investors. Thus the privatization program was conducted via the capital market, and the pace and scale of privatization attempts were determined according to the size of existing capital markets. It was a gradualist program: "[This] emphasis of divestiture via the capital market was also consistent with the government's political objective of incorporating a significant portion of middle-income population into the privatization process, thereby helping to extend property ownership to wider segments of the society as part of its program of 'popular capitalism'" (Öniş 1998:154) . In 1988, for instance, the shares of TELETAŞ (a telecommunications company) sold via 4,822 branch banks to 41,695 shareholders, an impressive number. Because of the small size of the domestic capital market in the 1980s and early 1990s (Ilkin 1994:81) , however, this policy could not continue. This is one reason why the privatization of state enterprises seemed as if they were "more talked about than done" (Anderson 2011:441) during the Özal decade compared to the Erdoğan decade.
A third feature of neoliberalism during the Özal Decade related to domestic political cooptation was its coexistence with a new form of populism. Of course, clientalistic/ patronage politics aimed at buying the votes of the masses through diverse types of rewards, gifts, redistributions targeting the most disadvantaged/most contentious segments of the society were not new in Turkish politics. However, neoliberal ideology hitherto associated these kinds of rentseeking behaviors with politics under ISI-led developmentalism (Öniş 2004:126) . In Turkey, populism reemerged under the neoliberalism of Özal, who knew very well that (1) the emerging social unrest in the late 1970s was heavily supported by working classes, (2) the costs of neoliberal reforms would disproportionably be carried by them, hence (3) he needed to "buy" the votes and the consent of these masses to stay in power and to contain their discontent. In this pursuit, Özal extensively relied on a vast system of "funds" outside the control of the Assembly and the bureaucracy for governmental expenditure. According to many scholars, these funds were a system of "legalized corruption" (Oyan and Aydin 1987; Ahmad 1993:191) . In addition to populist attempts at pragmatic redistribution through funds like the "poor fund," Özal also distributed construction licenses through gecekondu affi (shantytown amnesty), and allowed gecekondu dwellers to build more stories in their houses. These funds and redistributions not only helped reduce reproduction costs of laborers and kept wages as low as possible for capital, but also helped Özal stay in power during elections.
These examples illustrate that neoliberalism in Turkey was not primarily preoccupied with a redistribution of class power in favor of the big bourgeoisie. Indeed, if such redistribution was the aim of neoliberalism under Özal, it was unsuccessful. In the 1978-1979 period, when laborers had the highest real wages of their history, industrialists had a share of 29% in the overall capital accumulation. In 1988, during the height of Özal's neoliberal agenda, this share declined to 16% (Boratav 2006:162) . The change of the share of different income clusters across years shows that the highest 20 percent of the population commanded over 56.5% of national income in 1973, which fell to 49.9% in 1987. All other income groups, however, managed to increase their share of national income in the same period (see Table 1 ). Curiously, the same trend continued in the post-Özal period. As Table 2 ILO(1987) ILO (1994) ILO (2002) ILO ( Likewise, when the United States realized the necessity to contain Kurdish threats in the Middle East (which exist in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran) to reassert its influence in the region, Özal started to mention the Kurdish identity of his (grand)mother. Until that time, mentioning the words "Kurds" or "Kurdish" in public was generally regarded as breaking a taboo in Turkish society (Kramer 2000:37) . Suddenly, in 1991, draconian laws against the use of Kurdish language were partially loosened and celebration of the Newroz was made "formally" legal (Aral 2001; Acar 2002:176) . In this new era, Özal began to discuss the possibility of a "democratic solution" of the Kurdish problem to undercut the popular support enjoyed by the PKK. While taking initial steps toward loosening Turkey's policy of denial of the existence of a Kurdish ethnic identity (Çandar 2013:33; Ataman 2002 ), Özal initiated a rapid rapprochement with Iraqi
Kurds (Ersel et al. 2002b:361) . After bilateral talks, Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) established contact offices in Ankara (Çandar 2013:33) . When the PKK declared its first-ever ceasefire in March 1993, it became apparent that they were also tuning their ears to "democratic opening" messages of the Turkish statesmen and nurturing hopes for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem.
One month after the PKK's declaration of ceasefire, on 17 April 1993, Turgut Özal suddenly died of a heart attack-a matter still of ongoing controversy in Turkish politics. Many suspect an assassination such as one attempted in 1988. After his death, a vicious cycle in the economic and political arena emerged. Economic catastrophes of the 1990s and early 2000s were largely the consequences of the neoliberal reform strategy applied during the Özal decade.
Especially after a full-scale opening of the capital account in 1989, economic growth rapidly decreased, inflation dramatically took off and the economy started to face successive crises in 1994, 2000, and 2001 . In this period, further implementation of neoliberal reforms was put on the back burner.
In the political sphere, the close relationship between the United States and Turkey proved to be over-dependent on Özal himself, who bypassed bureaucracy and parliaments to "get things done" whenever necessary (Abramowitz 2013:38; Öniş 2004) . In his absence, Turkish political society -once again -started to move away from "recommendations" coming out of Washington Table 2 ; also Günçavdı and Bayar 2011).
For many scholars, the similarities between Özal and Erdoğan were so evident that they summarized the relationship as "Two Men, One Story" (Heper 2013 ). Erdoğan and other prominent members of the AKP also reinforced this perception by continuously highlighting that they adhered to the same ideology as Özal (Taşkın 2012) . From his clientelistic networks to corruption scandals, from his Machiavellist pragmatism to one-man-party politics, many of his critics also saw in Erdoğan a new, and upgraded, Özal.
I do not have space here to provide a full-fledged comparison of these two leaders and their political reforms. Yet, to bring back the theoretical emphasis of this paper, it is important to underscore that these two men were not the same at all. In many ways, Erdoğan's political career was the opposite of Özal's. His political horizon was not influenced by an admiration of the United States. He did not receive a foreign technocratic training. His life trajectory never intersected with American financial circles. Until the turn of the century, with an anti-American standing and an anti-free market attitude, Erdoğan was a follower of Erbakan's radical Islamist path, far more resembling an "anti-systemic" movement. It is not a coincidence that, even after 2002, the U.S. leaders did not know or trust Erdoğan as much as they knew and trusted Özal (Abramowitz 2013:37-38) .
This being the case, how did these two leaders with life careers and political horizons almost antithetical to each other end up pursuing a similar set of political and economic policies when they came in power? The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the seeming similarities (and some of the differences) between the Özal and the Erdoğan lie not in the personalities, ideologies, educations or professional trainings of these figures but in the circumstances and relationships created by the complex interconnection between the worldsystemic pressures (e.g. crisis of the U.S. world-hegemony) and various domestic-local level societal forces (e.g. escalation of anti-systemic movements, class struggle from below). At present, these crises have not been resolved either at the world-systemic or at the national level, but rather have deepened. Hence it is not surprising that the Erdoğan decade has also been shaped by similar kinds of economic and political policies which Özal pursued. But Erdoğan (and his policies) also differ from Özal (and his policies) in key aspects. This is not surprising either. After all, escalation of anti-systemic threats at the turn of the century, the September 11 incident, U.S. military involvement in the Middle East through the "War on Deeper embeddedness in domestic societal forces, however, is a double-edged sword. On the one hand it has more potential for pacifying social and political discontent and realigning contentious groups with the interests of the declining hegemonic power and its political and financial institutions. On the other hand, it increases the degree of autonomy of these leaders from the interests of the world-hegemonic bloc and makes these leaders or political groups more unpredictable. Hence, there is a fundamental contradiction in world-hegemons' attempts at cooptation during periods of hegemonic crisis. In these periods, they are compelled to establish contentious alliances with political leaders or groups they cannot easily control.
It is not difficult to see how this contradiction played out at the turn of the century in the context of Turkish politics. Although they did not know or trust Erdoğan as they knew Özal, the that the capacity of the former world-hegemon to generate consent has rapidly been diminishing.
